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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article proposes that a national mineral policy (“NMP”) can be crafted
to generate foreign direct investment (“FDI”) and strengthen sustainable
development goals. Less-developed countries (“LDCs”) typically overlook or
underestimate this federal policy imperative while seeking to harness mineral
1
resources. Creation of a NMP and complementary changes to federal mining
investment laws can provide host countries increased opportunities as well as
autonomy to profit from their own natural resources and, at the same time,

* Nadia B. Ahmad, Legal Fellow, Sustainable Development Strategies Group, LL.M. University of
Denver; J.D. University of Florida; B.A. University of California at Berkeley. A debt of gratitude to Professors
Luke Danielson and Cecilia Dalupan of the University of Denver and Dr. Ana Elizabeth Bastida of the
University of Dundee for their comments and encouragement. Special thanks to Diane Burkhardt, Joan
Policastri, Jane Dugger, and the staff of the Westminster Law Library. Sincere appreciation to Akmal and Senan
as well as my parents and my siblings for their love and support.
1. See infra Parts I-IV.
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investor nations can benefit from a NMP because of further mining prospects.
This Article goes on to discuss how the formulation and implementation of a
3
NMP can work to actualize sustainable development goals for LDCs. Typically,
even a well-intentioned NMP may afford only superficial sustenance to
subsurface investment projects because of the presently inadequate investment
regime for extractive industries. If, however, LDCs develop and implement
NMPs with investment safeguards for trade and export with foreign investors and
multinational enterprises, then the countries can begin to more fully reap the
4
rewards of previously stalled mining enterprise ventures.
By way of example, I will explore how the world’s second largest known
gold reserves, located in the Central Asian state of Tajikistan, remain unearthed
because of a precautionary and highly administrative approach to international
investment law. With a NMP, Tajikistan can improve its national standing in the
World Trade Organization (“WTO”) as a member nation. The development of a
NMP in Tajikistan can be effectuated by contextualizing historical happenings of
nation building and conflict to advance macro-level international investment law
5
and policy. Part I will provide an economic and political snapshot to natural
resource development in Tajikistan. Part II will coalesce overlapping goals of
mining enterprises and international investment for sustainable development.
Finally, Part III will show how to create a framework for international investment
law and policy to facilitate an advantageous NMP for host countries. The case of
Tajikistan’s unearthed gold reserves will demonstrate why the making of a NMP
is crucial not only in the case of Tajikistan, but other mineral-rich LDCs, to
augment FDI for mining enterprises.
II. TAJIKISTAN: AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SNAPSHOT
This section will provide an overview of economic and political happenings
that limit mineral exploration and production in Tajikistan. The rugged terrain
and the complications in communication have historically impeded the
development of a Tajik national identity because different parts of the country
6
rarely interacted. Its rapid escalation to independence also prevented national
7
leadership from preparing for the country’s future. In the late 1980s, the
openness of the Soviet regime of Mikhail S. Gorbachev sparked a nationalist
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
Anna Matveeva, The Perils of Emerging Statehood: Civil War and State Reconstruction in Tajikistan,
in CRISIS STATES WORKING PAPER SERIES NO. 2 1, 4 (2009), available at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/DigitalLibrary/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=98292.
7. Id. at 16.
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movement in Tajikistan, forcing Tajik leaders to declare sovereignty in 1991 with
8
the invariable dissolution of the Soviet Union. Tensions between the Russian
9
government, reform-minded Tajiks, and extremists still run deep. An
authoritative NMP for Tajikistan would account for these elements as well for
volatile economic considerations.
A. Regional Instability and Power Struggles in Tajikistan
Economic activity in Tajikistan increased at an average rate of 8.6% from the
10
period of 2000-2008 according to figures from the World Bank, but the gross
11
12
domestic product (“GDP”) fell to 6.5% in 2010, 7.4% in 2011, and 6.0% in
13
2012. To continue a more distinct upward trend in GDP, Tajikistan needs to
balance its national goal of prosperity with an aim at sustainable development in
14
light of its accession to the WTO. Following its independence in 1991 and the
ensuing civil war, the nation building process and development goals moved
forward with the help of foreign aid, FDI, non-governmental organizations
(“NGOs”), relief agencies, missionary groups, and the country’s own
15
development efforts for the past two decades. Tajikistan is carving a place for
itself on the global market, but continues to be the poorest in the former Soviet
16
sphere. Economic development and security assistance have been expanding
from the international community since the beginning of the NATO intervention
17
in Afghanistan, creating jobs and strengthening long-term stability.
In LDCs, like Tajikistan, the political institutions are actually part of the
development problem, and they “are usually only partially, and to differing
8. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, COUNTRY PROFILE: TAJIKISTAN 8 (Jan. 2007),
available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/ Tajikistan.pdf.
9. See, e.g., Daniel Tovrov, Russia Deports 300 Tajiks; Political Tensions Stew, INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS TIMES (Nov. 15, 2011), available at http://www.ibtimes.com/russia-deports-300-tajiks-politicaltensions-stew-370240.
10. Tajikistan: Country Brief 2011, WORLD BANK, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/
COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/TAJIKISTANEXTN/0.contentMDK:20630697~menuPK:287255~pagePK:141137~pi
PK:141127~theSitePK:258744,00.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2013).
11. The U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Central and South Asian States, collects data on GDP for
purposes of foreign diplomacy. Background Note: Tajikistan, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Nov. 16, 2012),
http://www. state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5775.htm.
12. Tajikistan Country Report, GLOBAL FIN., http://www.gfmag.com/gdp-data-country-reports/165tajikistan-gdp-country-report.html#axzz2AYMMvi4L (last visited Aug. 28, 2013).
13. Id. Figures for 2012 represent an estimate by Global Finance.
14. See Tajikistan Moves One More Step Towards Membership, WTO (July 5, 2011), http://www.wto.org
/english/news_e/news11_e/acc_tjk_05jul11_e.htm.
15. Environmental Performance Review: Tajikistan, U.N. Econ. Comm. For Europe: Comm. on Environmental
Policy 11 (2004), available at http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/epr/epr_studies/ tajikistan.pdf.
16. Introduction: Tajikistan, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/
countrytemplate_ti.html (last updated Aug. 23, 2011).
17. Id.
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degrees, capable of analyzing, evaluating and solving the economic, socio18
cultural and foreign-policy problems faced by these nations.” A lack of
institutionalization of the political system contributes to the overarching
19
development problem. Social contradictions also weaken existing political
institutions, because “class differences, ethnic diversity and cultural dualism”
impede “the mineral cohesion that is a precondition for the functioning of such
20
political institutions.” International investment laws must account for these
social obstacles in formulating mineral policies.
B. Accession to WTO Membership
Tajikistan has reached a critical juncture through its WTO membership, and
its government officials remain committed to integrating the world economy and
21
the WTO. Tajikistan has undertaken major institutional and structural reforms,
notably in its finance and banking system, so that it now trades with ninety
22
different countries. However, no institutional changes have occurred to account
for sustainable development strategies in the mining sector. Over the past two
years, the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) continues its assistance to the
government of Tajikistan to implement policies geared to maintaining ongoing
23
economic improvements. The IMF Extended Credit Facility (“ECF”) program
along with grants from the Asian Development Bank, the European Union, and
the World Bank have provided support to Tajikistan so that it can satisfy its
24
external financing needs. Even still, compared to other Central Asian countries
and international benchmarks, foreign exchange reserves in Tajikistan remain
25
relatively low.
Meanwhile, Tajikistan’s mountainous regions are suitable for the mining and
exploration of untapped precious metals, particularly gold. An accurate
assessment of the resource base may encourage the national government to allow
greater autonomy and a larger share of resource revenues, depending on whether
resources are relatively small compared to those of the nation as a whole or if

18. CHRISTIAN KIRCHNER ET AL., MINING VENTURES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES—PART 1: INTERESTS,
BARGAINING PROCESS, LEGAL CONCEPTS 41 (1979).
19. Id. at 42.
20. Id.
21. WTO, supra note 14.
22. Id.
23. IMF, Tajikistan: Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (MEFP) for 2011-12 39 (2012),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2012/cr1232.pdf.
24. WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK GROUP—PROGRAM PARTNERSHIP SNAPSHOT 27 (Apr. 2013),
available at http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam /Worldbank/document/Tajikistan-Snapshot.pdf.
25. IMF, REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: MIDDLE EAST AND CENTRAL ASIA 60 (Apr. 2011), available
at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2011/mcd/eng/pdf/mreo0411.pdf.
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resources are already seriously depleted. A realistic assessment of resource
reserves shows that resource extraction alone is not a viable basis for the entire
27
regional economy. An initial step critical to the process of attracting foreign
investment for mineral extraction is to begin a modern geological survey with
funding, perhaps by the World Bank, to establish a solid general geologic and
28
geophysical database that identifies areas of mineral potential. The most
common way for a country to promote its mineral wealth and positive investment
climate is to have a large, significant mineral deposit developed by a foreign
29
company. This first development of a major mining operation is crucial because
it proves to the global mining industry that a foreign company in the country can
30
mine a deposit.
III. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, FDI, AND MINING
Increasing numbers of large mining companies are seeking to incorporate
31
sustainable development principles in their corporate practices. Sustainable
development, as defined in Our Common Future, also known as the Brundtland
Report, “is development that meets the needs of the present without
32
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”
Despite the consensus of FDI for sustainable development, there is a gap between
the existing regulatory framework for international investment laws and norms
33
that advocate sustainability. International investment agreements have great
26. Siri Aas Rustad et al., Building or Spoiling Peace? Lessons from the Management of High-Value
Natural Resources, 42 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10546, 10547 (2012). “During the 2005 peace
negotiations between Aceh and the Indonesian government, for example, the depletion of Aceh’s reserves made
wealth-sharing between the government of Indonesia and Aceh less relevant—which probably contributed to
the Indonesian government’s willingness to grant Aceh better terms, with respect to revenue-sharing from oil
and gas exploitation in Aceh.” Id.
27. Id. “[E]ven the central government may have inaccurate perceptions of resource reserves and of what
can be achieved with them, and may therefore fail to develop other sectors of the economy. The government
budget of Southern Sudan (now South Sudan), for example, has been financed almost entirely by oil revenues;
unless the country is able to develop the non-oil sectors of its economy, a decline in those revenues would
jeopardize its economic viability as an independent state.” Id.
28. E-mail from Mark T. Nesbitt, Of Counsel, Fognani & Faught, PLLC to Nadia B. Ahmad, Legal
Fellow, Sustainable Development Strategies Group, (Aug. 1, 2011, 08:16 A.M.) (on file with author).
29. Id.; Tony Killick, The Benefits of Foreign Direct Investment and its Alternatives: An Empirical
Exploration, 9 J. OF DEV. STUD. 301, 301-02 (1973) (discussing the benefits derived in mineral activities by the
host economy from the activities and investment of foreign-owned companies).
30. Nesbitt, supra note 28.
31. Heledd Jenkins & Natalia Yakovleva, Corporate Social Responsibility in the Mining Industry:
Exploring Trends in Social and Environmental Disclosure, 14 J. OF CLEANER PRODUCTION 271, 273 (2006),
available at http://www.academia.edu/3375037/Corporate_social_responsibility_in_the_mining_industry_
exploring_trends_in_social_and_environmental_disclosure.
32. Brundtland Report, Report of the World Commission on Environmental & Development: Our
Common Future, U.N. Doc. A/42/427 (Oct. 1987).
33. Markus Gehring & Andrew Newcombe, An Introduction to Sustainable Development in World
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potential to promote sustainable development norms and fulfill their ultimate
34
objective to protect international investment regimes. The United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”) was established in 1964 to
support the development-friendly integration of developing countries into the
35
world economy. UNCTAD has progressively evolved into an authoritative
knowledge-based institution to help shape current policy debates and thinking on
development, with an acute focus on ensuring that domestic policies and
international action are mutually supportive in bringing about sustainable
36
development. The efficient use of natural resources along with the protection of
37
health and the environment requires a wide array of policies and regulations.
International and regional norms work with national and sub-national laws to
38
establish a broad set of legal rules. Broadly speaking, interstitial modifying
norms are used to regulate government conduct, but do not provide an objective
39
measure for accountability mechanisms for mining enterprises. A NMP would
provide a conceptual framework for legal norms governing mineral enterprises.
London-based Kryso Resources PLC (“Kryso”) is an AIM-listed mineral
40
exploration and development company that focuses on projects in Tajikistan. It
is the only foreign company that has been granted permits at the time of this
41
publication to explore Tajikistan’s gold reserves. Since Kryso is the first major
foreign investor in the Tajikistan gold mining sector, its investment presents
opportunities and challenges. Developing, exploring, and extracting Tajikistan’s
gold reserves can incorporate sustainable development to attract investors both

Investment Law, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD INVESTMENT LAW 1, 9 (Marie-Claire Cordonier
Segger et al. eds., 2011).
34. Id. at 9-10.
35. About UNCTAD, UNCTAD, http://unctad.org/en/Pages/AboutUs.aspx (last visited Aug. 30, 2013).
UNCTAD functions as a forum for intergovernmental deliberations for consensus building. It also undertakes
research, policy analysis and data collection for the debates of government representatives and experts and
offers technical assistance tailored to the specific requirements of developing countries with special attention to
the needs of the least developed countries and of economies in transition. Id.
36. Id.
37. Asa Romson, International Investment Law and the Environment, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN
WORLD INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 33, at 43.
38. See id. Civil and criminal laws interact to play a significant role in the development of the country’s
administrative laws. A common way to arrange administrative components of health and environmental laws is
to divide the instruments into three major categories: direct regulation or “command and control,” economic
incentives, and information-based or voluntary approaches. Id.
39. Ulrich Beyerlin, Sustainable Development, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW, para. 16, (2009), available at http://www.mpepil.com/sample_article?id=/epil/entries/law-9780199231690
-e1609&recno=9&.
40. About Us, KRYSO, http://www.kryso.com/About%20Us.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2013). AIM is the
London Stock Exchange’s market for smaller and growing companies.
41. Dilafruz Nabiyeva, Britain’s Kryso Resources Starts Developing Pakrut Gold Deposit in Tajikistan,
CENTRAL ASIA ONLINE (May 9, 2012), available at http://centralasiaonline.com/en_GB/articles/caii/features/
main/2012/05/09/feature-02.
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foreign and domestic. While stakeholder engagement and education are
imperative, having an authoritative NMP would be critical for sustainable
42
international investment in the mining sector. A revamped geological study
43
would be the next critical step for attracting FDI. The World Bank could
44
provide initial funding for this study.
Tajikistan’s present federal laws permit ways for foreign investors to
participate in the market, but are inadequate to protect the country’s development
goals. Articles 4 and 5 of the Law on Foreign Investment in the Republic of
45
Tajikistan provide the parameters for foreign investors to invest in the country.
However, definitional standards in Articles 4 and 5 are overly broad and
46
contextually vague for project details. Tajikistan’s investment laws do not
address the wide investment scope for mining projects that involve complex
issues related to real property, land use, pollution, environmental toxins, and
mineral rights.
A viable NMP could improve FDI in Tajikistan’s mining sector and
simultaneously preserve its national interests. The rate of progress for
47
implementation of national legislation regarding mining has been slow. This lull
48
in advancement can be linked to a lack of political consensus on key issues. The
formulation of an NMP encourages discussions, cooperation, and agreement
among politicians, government administrators, and the private sector and lays the
49
framework for effective regulatory reform. Each country has its own set of
social, political, economic, and legal factors to consider when formulating a
NMP. Political factors, such as interested government agencies and private sector
50
groups, set the agenda for global economic policy.
51
International investment law is a building block of the global economy.
Foreign investment occurs in settings that require international cooperation
52
because of the involvement of the host nation as a state actor. The government
and its legal system establish institutions that sustain a functioning economy,
while simultaneously imposing constraints on the government’s power to
regulate and interfere in economic activities. As such, the formulation of a NMP
42. See infra Part IV.
43. Nesbitt, supra note 28.
44. Id.
45. Law on Foreign Investment in the Republic of Tajikistan, Arts. 4-5, available at http://www.
tajinvest.tj/downloads/eng_zakon/3.pdf.
46. See id.
47. James M. Otto, A National Mineral Policy as a Regulatory Tool, 23 RESOURCES POL’Y 1 (1997).
48. Id at 1.
49. Id at 1-2.
50. Id at 2-3.
51. See generally STEPHAN W. SCHILL, THE MULTILATERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW (2009).
52. Id. at 3.
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will incorporate development goals and development planning. In the 1990s,
senior mining companies started publishing corporate responsibility policies
53
discussing environmental, health and safety, and community issues. These
54
policies ranged from strong to weak. The weaker policies contained relatively
general pledges, whereas the stronger policies provided more active commitment
engagement, such as the recognition of the need for local consultation and
55
community development.
Foreign companies seeking to invest in Tajikistan’s gold mining industry
would likely have to incorporate such techniques for community development. In
fact, the government should require a certain standard for environmental, health
and safety, and community issues for FDI projects. The formulation and
implementation of concrete government goals for economic and social
56
developments are necessary. Development goals vary widely, but can include
growth of gross national product and per capita income, expansion of regional
infrastructure, diversification of industrial structure, promotion of importsubstituting industries, promotion of industries for export, creation of
employment, administrative restructuring and reforms, improvement of the
educational system, redistribution of national income, and promotion and
57
dynamization of agricultural production. These development goals account for
competing interests, infrastructure, and industries for mining ventures in
developing nations. As broad as these goals may be, they represent the
complexity on the national and local levels for FDI in newly independent,
developing countries.
In 1998, nine of the world’s biggest mining companies operating within the
World Business Council for Sustainable Development (“WBCSD”) collaborated
to create a joint agenda to tackle “the industry’s reputational, environmental and
social concerns under the rubric of sustainable development” to form a group
58
called the “Global Mining Initiative.” These mining companies pooled their
influence and resources “to exercise an agenda-setting influence upon both the
59
mining industry and its critics.” WBCSD prepared a recent report called Vision
2050 to lay a pathway for a global population of nearly nine billion people to live
60
within the resource limits of the planet by 2050. Although distinct, the elements
53. DAVID SZABLOWSKI, TRANSNATIONAL LAW AND LOCAL STRUGGLES: MINING, COMMUNITIES AND
82-83 (2007).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. KIRCHNER ET AL., supra note 18, at 43.
57. Id.
58. SZABLOWSKI, supra note 51, at 84-85.
59. Id.
60. Vision 2050: The New Agenda for Business – Executive Summary, WORLD BUS. COUNCIL FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, 1, http://www.wbcsd.org/pages/edocument/edocumentdetails.aspx?id=219&no
searchcontextkey=true (last visited Aug. 30, 2013). This groundbreaking work is the culmination of an 18-

THE WORLD BANK
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of Vision 2050 illustrate “the interconnectedness of issues such as water, food
and energy—relationships that must be considered in an integrated and holistic
61
way, with tradeoffs that must be understood and addressed.”
Factoring in positive and negative externalities and carbon emissions with
the cost of mining operations would assist national development goals as well as
62
global norms for sustainable development. Land use planning of mining
projects in conjunction with national goals for agriculture and land conservation
63
would have to be considered. The omission of non-investment human rights and
64
environmental rules by investment tribunals is significant. This absence of any
reference to general environmental law principles in investor-state jurisprudence
applies equally to sustainable development particularly in the context of human
65
rights. The status of sustainable development is “rather unclear in international
law” and “no consensus on whether it is a general principle of law producing
substantive obligations, or a mere conceptual matrix, an objective, a process
66
devoid of any law creating character” exists.
For sustainable development to enter the legal discourse, it is necessary to
consider it on the national level and plan for it accordingly. Christian Kirchner
asserts that “[c]entral planning of economics and social development is a
commonly recognized and practiced policy in the Third World,” but Kirchner
67
neglects to consider the sustainable development aspect of the planning process.
Riccardo Pavoni recognizes the importance of paying attention “to the
month combined effort with CEOs and experts, and dialogues with over 200 companies and external
stakeholders in 20 countries. The report spells out the “must haves”—the things that must happen over the
coming decade to make a sustainable planetary society possible. These include incorporating the costs of
externalities, starting with carbon, ecosystem services and water, into the structure of the marketplace; doubling
agricultural output without increasing the amount of land or water used; halting deforestation and increasing
yields from planted forests: halving carbon emissions worldwide (based on 2005 levels) by 2050 through a shift
to low-carbon energy systems and improved demand-side energy efficiency, and providing universal access to
low-carbon mobility. Id.
61. Id. at 2.
62. Roque Romero, Fostering the Positive Externalities of Mining—Policy Options, 15 CENTRE FOR
ENERGY, PETROLEUM & MIN. L. & POL’Y 1, 3-4 (2005).
63. KRISTAL MAZE ET AL., MINING AND BIODIVERSITY IN SOUTH AFRICA: A DISCUSSION PAPER 1
(2004), available at http://www.forest-trends.org/documents/files/doc_602.pdf.
64. Riccardo Pavoni, Environmental Rights, Sustainable Development, and Investor-State Case Law: A
Critical Appraisal, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION 525, 528–29
(Pierre-Marie Dupuy et al. eds., 2009).
65. Id. at 528.
66. Id. at 528-29.
67. KIRCHNER ET AL., supra note 18. A key component of development plans and programs is the
reliability of information and statistics. Yet due to weak economic and administrative structures, the collection
of such data is increasingly difficult. Rational planning necessitates development of plans that represent
consistent extensions of earlier initiatives: “Formal planning, apart from its substantive objectives, can take on
further significance as elements of political rationality that generally favors the development of an industrial
economic structure. In some cases, therefore, the existence of formal planning alone may balance out many of
the instabilities of political institutions.” Id.
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relationship between investment law and the exercise of environmental
68
participatory rights at the national level.” Pavoni states that public participation
is “linked to other general principles, concepts, and requirements of vital
importance, not only for environmental law, but also for the matter of
69
international public policy.”
In Tajikistan, gold is not only a means of economic freedom, but political
upliftment and social empowerment, which are earmarks of successful economies
as well as democracies. According to a report by Safe Haven: Preservation of
Capital, Kryso is an emerging mineral exploration company that seeks to explore
gold and other precious and base metal deposits previously discovered in Central
70
Asia, bringing them into production. Kryso was admitted to the AIM in
December 2004 in order to continue funding the development of the Pakrut Gold
Deposit, explore the Pakrut Licence Area, and obtain and acquire other gold and
71
base metal deposits in Tajikistan and elsewhere in Central Asia. Being listed as
an AIM company is a milestone because, for the majority of junior mining
companies listed on AIM, it means that “their analysis requires even more
specialist technical information not typically required in analyzing industrial,
72
financial, or service based smaller U.K. companies.” Kryso highlights its
selection as the first foreign company to obtain a one hundred percent interest in
73
a mining and exploration project in Tajikistan. In April 2004, LLC Pakrut, a
wholly owned subsidiary of Kryso, was granted a license and geological lease to
74
explore and exploit the Pakrut License. This Pakrut area is reputed to have the
75
second largest known gold resource after the Witwatersrand in South Africa.
IV. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY
CONSIDERATIONS FOR AN NMP
Prior to the actual investment, both the host nation and investor have
converging interests for the establishment of the investment, but once a deal is
struck, the dynamics between the relationship of the host nation and the investor
76
are dramatically changed. The host nation has an incentive to unilaterally alter
the original contract terms, amending investment laws, or even expropriating the

68. Pavoni, supra note 64, at 545.
69. Id.
70. Kryso Resources PLC (London:KYS): New Recommendation, SAFE HAVEN: PRESERVATION OF
CAPITAL (June 10, 2009), http://www.safehaven.com/article/13573/kryso-resources-plc.
71. Id.
72. UNDERSTANDING JUNIOR MINERS, AIM MINING RES. LTD. (Fiona Perrott-Humphrey ed., 2006).
73. KRYSO, supra note 40.
74. SAFE HAVEN, supra note 70.
75. Id.
76. SCHILL, supra note 51, at 3.
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77

investor without compensation. This political risk results from opportunistic
behavior that raises investment costs to the investor and may in an extreme cases
78
block FDI entirely.
As a general principle of sovereignty, a state is under no legal obligation to
permit investment within its borders, but once a state admits foreign investors, it
is required to afford them “the protection of the law and provide for a certain
79
standard of treatment.” Should the situation arise, the host nation cannot
80
exercise its territorial sovereignty in an arbitrary manner. For example, in the
United States, bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”) require that particular
81
standards be upheld in the pre-entry stage. While the standards for national and
most-favored-nation (“MFN”) treatment rely on the treatment accorded to a
reference group, investment treaties can mandate standards of treatment on host
states, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security,
which are “absolute in character and grant protection to foreign investors
independent of the host State’s treatment of its own nationals or of third-party
82
nationals.” The obligation of national treatment has commanding influence in
trade law for questioning differentiated treatment of goods based on
83
environmental grounds.
Possible choices for applicable laws are based on the bargaining power and
84
negotiating skills of the parties in creating investment contracts. The rules of
admission, however, can pose requirements for the host nation, which may limit
85
investor rights for dispute settlement if the investor ignores rules on admission.
Thus, violations of domestic law may place investments outside of substantive
86
guarantees. Having an effective dispute settlement mechanism is “at the heart of
87
any investment code.” Yet nations balk at enacting a firm dispute settlement

77. Id.
78. See id. at 3-5.
79. Alexandra N. Diehl, Tracing a Success Story, or, “The Baby Boom of BITs”: Characteristics and
Particularities of the Tight Net of Bilateral Investment Treaties Existing Today, in INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW IN CONTEXT 7, 11 (August Reinisch et al. eds., 2008).
80. Id.
81. Id. (“Article 3 of the US Model BIT prescribes that each party shall accord to investors of the other
party treatment no less favorable than it accords, in like circumstances to its own investors with respect to
establishment(!) [sic], acquisition, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments
in its territory (so-called ‘national treatment’). Article 4 of the US Model BIT stipulates that ‘most-favorednation treatment’ should be accorded to the establishment phase as well.”).
82. SCHILL, supra note 51, at 78.
83. Romson, supra note 37, at 45.
84. RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 74
(2008).
85. Id. at 85.
86. See id.
87. Edward M. Graham, Towards an Asia Pacific Investment Code, in INVESTMENT ISSUES IN ASIA AND
THE PACIFIC RIM 15, 29 (Carl J. Green & Thomas L. Brewer eds., 1995).
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process because of the implications on national sovereignty. The two existing
international bodies for investment disputes are the International Centre for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”), an entity of the World Bank, and
89
the United National Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”).
ICSID is an autonomous international institution whose primary purpose is to
provide facilities for conciliation and arbitration of international investment
90
disputes. UNCITRAL is the core legal body of the United Nations in the field of
international trade law business and its business is the modernization and
91
harmonization of rules on international business. ICSID and UNCITRAL,
however, require that both the disputing firm and government consent to the
resolution process, and even then, neither dispute resolution body can enforce the
92
settlement.
A. Deficiencies in Existing Norms for NMPs
Mining acts usually fail to stipulate the time period from the date of
application in which the granting authority must decide to grant or reject an
93
exploration application. This missing timetable is important because delays
94
occur in the process. More recent mining acts stipulate—either in the act or in
the regulations—a maximum decision-making and processing time limit, and
some acts even provide that if an application is not decided within a certain time,
95
it is “deemed” to have been approved. Practically speaking, administrative
procedures may not comply with the time limits set by the statute, but such limits
96
may reduce the risk of indecision. Kryso has set a timetable to start mining on
97
Pakrut gold deposits in 2014. Kryso expects that capacity for this project will be

88. Id.
89. Id.
90. About ICSID, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, https://icsid.worldbank. org/ICSID/
Index.jsp (last visited Aug. 16, 2013) (“ICSID sought to remove major impediments to the free international
flows of private investment posed by non-commercial risks and the absence of specialized international
methods for investment dispute settlement. ICSID was created by the Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States as an impartial international forum providing
facilities for the resolution of legal disputes between eligible parties through conciliation or arbitration
procedures.”).
91. About UNCITRAL, U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/about
_us.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2013).
92. Graham, supra note 87, at 29. Procedures for the ICSID and UNCITRAL have been criticized for
being legalistic and biased in favor of nations. Id. at 30.
93. JAMES OTTO & JOHN CORDES, THE REGULATION OF MINERAL ENTERPRISES: A GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVE ON ECONOMICS, LAW AND POLICY 3-19 (2002).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. V. Zhavoronkova, British Company to Start Gold Mining in Tajikistan, TREND, (Oct. 31, 2012),
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660,000 tons of ore per year and is expected to grow up to 1.32 million tons per
98
year in 2017. This timetable and generation capacity may be upset due to
political and social instability in the country, which is why a viable NMP is
crucial.
Mining acts do not always make clear which official has the power to grant
an exploration right, because in some acts, the granting power may reside with
99
the “government” or with several levels of government. Unless another act
clearly identifies the government officer authorized to make the grant on behalf
of the government, difficulties can arise when several agencies or levels of
100
government vie for control. In most nations, the granting of a mining right in
most nations “does not convey the state’s or people’s ownership interest in in situ
101
minerals to the mining right holder.” This nuance demonstrates the state’s
102
intent to maintain “permanent sovereignty over its mineral endowment.” A
mining lease or concession simply grants a right to a mine, as opposed to a real
103
property interest in the minerals underground.
Modern investment protection does not effectively empower arbitral
104
tribunals on the procedural and institutional level. The vagueness of underlying
substantive investor rights impedes FDI: “[b]oth wording and concept of standard
guarantees, such as indirect expropriation, fair and equitable treatment or full
protection of security, are of such indeterminacy that they lack hard and
105
ascertainable normative content.”
B. Taxation Issues
Taxation consequences of international investment regimes also bear upon
national policy. The structure of the fiscal regimes can be described as profit106
based fiscal regimes and revenue-based regimes. The profit-based regimes
depend upon corporate income tax and dividend withholding tax, while revenue-

http://en.trend.az/capital/business/2082589.html.
98. Id.
99. OTTO & CORDES, supra note 91, at 3-25. “In most [recent] mining acts, the unrestricted transparent
power to grant an exploration right is clearly given to a titled officer, usually an official in the ministry
responsible for the mines. . . . [Yet n]ot all mining acts require a grant of exploration rights by a government
officer. [This] right may appear as a general nonexclusive right under the mining act automatically upon mere
completion of a registration process.” Id. at 3-25.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 3-44.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. SCHILL, supra note 51, at 263.
105. Id.
106. KOH NAITO & FELIX REMY, MINING SECTOR REFORM AND INVESTMENT—RESULTS OF A GLOBAL
SURVEY 72 (2001).
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based regimes depend upon royalties, import and export duties, and value-added
107
taxes (“VAT”). On account of market fluctuations in profitability under
cyclically changing international mineral prices, mining investors prefer profit108
based tax regimes. In Latin America, successful mining reform countries have
made the switch from revenue-based to profit-based systems, but many countries
continue to apply schemes based on output or input taxes such as royalties,
109
custom duties, VAT, and employment taxes. Analysts that support preferential
tax treatment for mineral investors propose that mining risks are “sufficiently
110
different in magnitude and character to justify special consideration.” Risks in
the mineral industry “are expressed as geological, commercial, or political factors
111
beyond the control of investors or inherent in the decision-making process.”
Even if a potentially good mine is discovered, a lengthy wait can be expected in
between discovery and exploration, and during that time, market factors can
112
impact project economies. As the host country, Tajikistan “has an interest in
the realization of a continuous and steady income stream to serve as the basis of
reliable long-term economic planning,” but on the national level, it is important
for policymakers to be mindful that “short-term economic opportunities usually
113
cannot be exploited if they imply risking a future minimum income level.”
C. International Corporate Social Responsibility
International investment law, like general international law, should address
the concept of International Corporate Social Responsibility (“ICSR”) in the
development of laws, rules, procedures, and decision-making. ICSR obligations
are “the quid pro quo for the protection of investors and investments under
international investment protection agreements and international economic rules
114
such as of the WTO.” ICSR is a separate concept than governance, which
describes “the organization of ownership, participation, disclosure and decision115
making in corporations.” ISCR regards the wider relationships between the
116
business entity and social actors. Peter Muchlinski argues “the interaction of
the two concepts is significant from the perspective of putting ICSR into
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. OTTO AND CORDES, supra note 93, 7-9.
111. Id. at 7-10.
112. Id.
113. ERICH SCHANZE ET AL., MINING VENTURES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: PART 2: ANALYSIS OF
PROJECT AGREEMENTS 112 (1981).
114. Peter Muchlinski, Corporate Social Responsibility, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 637, 643, 645 n.21 (Peter Muchlinski et al. eds., 2008).
115. Id. at 645.
116. See id.
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Muchlinski proposes that one way to ensure corporate
operation.”
responsibility for employment rights or health and safety would be to incorporate
worker participation and consultation within the firm through laws that require
the establishment of works councils or the placement of worker representatives
118
on the company board.
Tajikistan still has a patterned record for human rights, so labor programs
119
should be designed to improve development in this area. At the grassroots
level, education for high school and university students to inform them of the
necessity of human rights and the sustainable development of Tajikistan is
120
another core problem. Human rights reports generally praise Tajikistani
students’ openness and eagerness to discuss human rights, even though the Tajik
121
government considers human rights a taboo subject
D. Towards a Viable NMP
Models for mining policies for countries similarly situated to Tajikistan
122
include Malawi, Kazakhstan, and Ghana. For example, in southern Africa, a
region that is also mineral-rich, like Tajikistan, but poverty-stricken, the
discussion of mining policies and stakeholder participation is already taking
123
root. The Kryso gold exploration project in Pakrut is critical even though
London-based Kryso is not a substantially large company. So much is at stake
with this venture, including how company and local stakeholders will benefit
from the investment. Tajikistan’s central government should also include
safeguards in its NMP for the formulation of investment contracts. Poor contracts
may undermine the government’s legitimacy among its people “if the contracts
create the impression that the state is corrupt or incapable of looking after the
124
interests of the country as a whole.” Poor contract terms allow corruption to
fester by enabling extractive firms too much power in the nation’s internal affairs
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. George Camm, Human Rights in Tajikistan: Don’t Even Mention It, INSIDE THE COCOON: CENTRAL
ASIA TODAY (Aug. 26, 2011, 2:59 AM), http://www.eurasianet.org/node/64096.
120. See generally US DEP’T OF STATE, TAJIKISTAN 2012 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, (2012), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/204625.pdf.
121. Id.
122. Nesbitt, supra note 28.
123. For example, an effective policy in the southern African development community will engineer the
delicate balance between poverty reduction and an internationally competitive minerals sector. This balance
enhances the possibility of long-term economic growth and development in the SADC region. The overriding
advantage of this strategy is that it generates home-grown policy instruments and implementation of mineral
law with which stakeholders can identify. See H.D. Mtegha et al., National minerals policies and stakeholder
participation for broad-based development in the southern African development community (SADC), 31
RESOURCES POLICYPOL’Y 4, 231-38, (2006).
124. Rustad et al., supra note 26, at 10550.
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and allowing extractive firms to engage in unsustainable resource use. On the
other hand, better contracts may “stipulate improved conditions for workers;
establish stricter environmental and social safeguards; and include provisions for
local development projects, such as the construction of schools, wells, and
126
roads—all of which provide tangible peace dividends for local populations.”
The national government must negotiate its position when allowing mining
firms to explore and extract within its border. The government cannot give away
its resources and have less money to construct and maintain infrastructure,
127
schools, and other facilities. In negotiating contracts, the government must also
consider the possibility of environmental disaster and should develop emergency
cleanup plans.
V. CONCLUSION
The sustainable mining practices and policies discussed in this Article, in the
context of international investment legal regimes, show the impetus for a viable
NMP. Despite the high market demand for gold, unsustainable investment
techniques have hindered Tajikistan’s mining enterprises and accelerated
128
environmental degradation. As a caveat, the mining industry must be regulated
and security measures implemented to protect the business integrity of any gold
129
mining projects. Similar to any major development project, the risk of
130
environmental degradation and economic exploitation are elevated. While
multi-national entities may in the future be able to extract and export gold from
Tajikistan, others will also seek the rewards of this multibillion-dollar annual
131
trade, including rebels, drug cartels, and common criminals. Nonetheless,
Tajikistan with its large and hidden gold reserves could be a serious contender on
the gold commodity market, and a viable NMP, could stimulate Tajikistan’s
mining investment projects so that it encourages sustainable FDI.

125. See id.
126. Id.
127. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK 141 (2006).
128. See supra Part II.
129. See supra Part IV.
130. See supra Part III.
131. Elizabeth Dickinson, Foreign Policy: Downgrade Good as Gold, Literally, NATIONAL PUBLIC
RADIO, (Aug. 10, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/08/10/139347972/foreign-policy-downgrade-good-as-goldliterally?sc=tw&cc=share.
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